|

The Arab-Israeli
Conflict as a Prisoners'
Dilemma
May 2008
Scholars of Arab-Israeli
strife often argue that
the belligerents in this
conflict do not hold
irreconcilable aims, but
rather than enmity
persists because the
very structure of the
conflict inhibits trust
and cooperation.
This paper examines that
argument by evaluating
whether the
game-theoretical
"prisoners' dilemma" – in
which two actors'
mirroring incentive
structures impede a
mutually acceptable
solution – accurately
models the Arab-Israeli
conflict. In
concludes that the
actors in this dilemma
bear little resemblance
to one or both sides,
however, by analyzing
three key theaters of
Arab-Israeli strife:
first, the
Israeli-Egyptian
relationship exemplifies
the regional nature of
the conflict.
Second,
Israel-Palestinian
Authority (PA)
negotiations in general
– and the 2000 Camp
David II summit in
particular – identify
the localized issues
which constitute the
core of the conflict.
Third,
Israel-Palestinian
relations during and
after the second
Palestinian intifadah
reveal the most recent
obstacles to cooperation
in the aftermath of the
Oslo Accords.
Hamas: An Islamist Wedge
in Palestinian
Nationalism
May 2008
In
January 2006, Hamas – the
leading Palestinian
Islamist party and
terrorist organization –
won the Palestinian
Authority's legislative
elections against the
incumbent Fatah group.
In June 2007, Hamas
seized control of the
Gaza Strip while Fatah
entrenched itself in the
West Bank. Both
developments illustrate
the centrality of Hamas
to Palestinian politics
and therefore to U.S.
policymaking on the
Israeli-Palestinian
front. Although
the recent Annapolis
Conference has sidelined
Hamas, no comprehensive
settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian
conflict can discount
that movement's
political clout or its
hold over Gaza.
Accordingly, this paper
seeks to impart an
understanding of Hamas –
an Islamist wedge in an
historically secular
Palestinian nationalism
– and its implications
for U.S. policymaking in
particular. First,
it explains how
the Hamas-Fatah
confrontation evolved by
investigating both the
history of Hamas and the
divergent paths taken by
Islamism in Gaza and in
the West Bank.
Second, it outlines the
substantively different
ideologies of Hamas and
the secular Fatah to
shed greater light on
the two groups' rivalry.
The paper also probes
other influences on
Hamas' behavior that are
of special influence to
U.S. policymakers –
notably, Hamas'
relations with al-Qaeda
and Hizbullah.
Finally, the memorandum
addresses Hamas' current
strategic and tactical
considerations and
evaluates the likelihood
that the group will
truly moderate its
hardline views of enter
an Oslo-type peace
process in the
foreseeable future.
The
Land-for-Peace
Negotiating Paradigm
January 2008
Israel's
negotiating deontology
frames the
land-for-peace solution
to the
Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as a reciprocal
trade: Palestinian
receive their national
rights (i.e.,
sovereignty over certain
lands) in exchange for
not violating Israelis'
national rights (i.e.,
maintaining peaceful
relations with Israel).
And if Palestinians and
Israelis could agree on
a single definition of
'national rights,' this
might be a very simple
transaction. Yet a
distinct Palestinian
deontology asserts a
'justice principle' that
contradicts Israel's –
most clearly on the
issues of Jerusalem and
Palestinian refugee
rights – to the extent
of delegitimizing
Israel's very existence.
Evaluating Competing
Explanations of Iraq's
1990 Invasion of Kuwait
November 2007
Iraq occupied
Kuwait in 1990, writes
Andrew Parasiliti, "in
an attempt to shore up
its declining power and
influence" vis-à-vis its
Mideast neighbors.
Though he makes his case
by plotting Iraqi power
relative to seven other
Mideast states over the
course of four decades,
he also cites Saddam
Hussein's speech to his
Revolutionary Command
Council in January 1991.
This speech does not
contradict Parasiliti's
portrayal of an Iraq
preoccupied with its
relative strength, but
Saddam's remarks fit
equally well into F.
Gregory Gause's argument
that the Iraqi dictator
feared an absolute loss
of his regime to
external conspirators.
A
Philosophical Case for
Boycotting a Fatah-Hamas
Unity Government
November 2007
“Nearly two weeks ago,
Hamas and Fatah, the two
leading Palestinian
political factions,
concluded negotiations
in Mecca by agreeing to
form a national unity
government. Their
pact represents a major
victory for the
harder-line group Hamas
– the more moderate
Fatah agreed to lend it
legitimacy through the
coalition government,
but Hamas, which Israel
and many other Western
states list as a
terrorist group, refused
to temper its extremism.
Critique of Said's
Orientalism and
Lockman's Contending
Visions of the Middle
East
November 2007
Edward Said's polemic
Orientalism –
echoed by Zachary
Lockman's Contending
Visions of the Middle
East – suffers from
epistemological flaws
which, when combined
with its methodological
errors and
self-contradictions,
cast significant doubt
on its arguments.
|