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Introduction
The
Zionist movement created a Jewish state in four basic steps:
purchasing land within the Palestine Mandate, using immigration
to people that land, establishing a state to govern those
people, and waging war to defend that state.
Conventional wisdom holds that socialism was Israel’s
founding ideology, that socialist philosophy molded Zionist
means and ends, and that East European Jews with strong
communist and socialist credentials spearheaded the project of
reestablishing a Jewish state.[1]
Yet despite the alleged hegemony of Socialist Zionism
over that nationalist movement, capitalist
precepts determined how Zionist institutions prosecuted all
four of the core policies which underlay Israeli
independence, in violation of socialist principles.
This
may have been inevitable; Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky
(1880-1940) – a Ukrainian-born Jew who entered the Zionist
movement at the turn of the century and was “probably
[Zionism’s] only real political writer”[2]
– largely rejected collectivism in favor of classical liberal
and capitalist philosophies.
He incorporated his thinking into Revisionist Zionism,
the primary ideological counterpart to Socialist Zionism.
Revisionism was a prominent movement within Zionism –
its successor political party, the Likud, dominated Israeli
politics for the past three decades – but throughout the
Mandatory era (indeed, up to the 1977 Likud electoral victory),
“Revisionism remained in a subordinate position compared with
Socialist Zionism.”[3]
Yet the fact that capitalist and Revisionist principles
guided Israel (and its institutional predecessors) in its four major founding experiences reveals that Zionism was a
profoundly capitalist
form of nationalism.
I.
The Revisionist Case for Land Purchases
Historical
Background
The
last century of Ottoman rule over the Levant found a Palestinian
Arab peasantry “in a chronic state of poverty and
indebtedness,” the result of adverse agricultural and climatic
circumstances, inadequate infrastructure, and “rapacious tax
collectors and landowning interests.”[4]
The first half of the twentieth century, in particular,
witnessed “two separate cycles of [agricultural]
devastation.”[5]
Concomitantly – and in addition to other
“cultivation habits that limited output”[6]
– the musha’ system of periodic land redistribution,
applied to 45 to 60 percent of Mandatory Palestine’s
cultivated lands,[7]
distorted incentives for land improvements and exhausted the
soil.[8]
Rather
than equalizing land holdings, Ottoman land reforms of the late
nineteenth century – in particular the “introduction of land
registration in Palestine…after 1871” – formalized the
economic hegemony of “a relatively small, urban, landowning
elite” by streamlining its legal access to lands historically
farmed by the rural peasantry.
Most peasants opted to forego registering family
farmlands in their own names, both loathe to incur the
accompanying fees and fearful of being placed on the Ottoman
conscription roster. These
lands were registered instead in the names of local notables,
who let the peasants continue farming as tenants.
Other peasants obtained and utilized their title deeds to
finance the high-interest loans which were then common in rural
Palestine. Still
others avoided the land registration process altogether.
In the long run, these behaviors allowed the Palestinian
notable elite to amass “large landed estates,” and by the
First World War, “Palestinian village peasants had become
feeble wards of notable urban and landowning classes.”[9]
A
third historical trend further worsened the peasantry’s
plight: although Palestine’s non-Jewish population remained
level at slightly under 300,000 from the sixteenth to the late
nineteenth centuries, it doubled from 1882 to 1918, and doubled
again[10]
over the three decades of the Mandate.[11]
As the ratio of peasants to cultivable lands increased,
land holdings – musha’ shares especially, due to
their communal nature – were continually divided to support
this burgeoning rural population, “making the plots so small
or narrow that they were not worth farming.”[12]
Against
this background, Zionist associations – in particular the
Jewish National Fund (JNF), founded in 1901 under the World
Zionist Organization’s aegis – “utilized contributions of
Jews all over the world to purchase land on behalf of the Jewish
people and to coordinate its development.”[13]
Up to 1930, “Jewish settlement” supplanted largely
those Arabs who had become tenants on their own lands;
afterwards, the Jews bought mainly from “individual Arab small
property holders.”[14]
Jewish
land acquisitions were – and remain – a controversial
historical affair. While
some contemporary historians focus on the socioeconomic impact
of the three historical trends detailed above, others highlight
Zionist purchases’ “devastating effect on the Palestinian
peasantry.” The
latter even compare Zionism to “a project of settler
colonialism undertaken at the expense of the local Arab
population,” claiming that its aims “represented a threat to
[the Arabs’] existence.”[15]
Revisionist
Ideological Considerations
Here
Revisionist political philosophy becomes relevant.
First, Vladimir Jabotinsky was a devout individualist –
rewriting Genesis, he asserted that “[in] the beginning God
created the individual. Every
individual is king, equal to his fellow – and that fellow too
is king.” He
therefore denounced communism for yoking the individual to the
state, while he championed classical liberalism for upholding
the individual’s sway over politics and economics.
Moreover, he defended “free enterprise” and
emphasized the bourgeoisie’s role in effecting a “free
circulation of goods, an indispensable condition for the wealth
of nations” – defending the concentration of European Jews
within the Continent’s middle classes, unlike the Socialist
Zionists, who aimed at creating a Jewish agricultural and
industrial proletariat.[16]
The
state has no responsibility, Jabotinsky believed, to “rectify
social inequality” – a task which contradicts the right to
private property and “civic liberty.”
Indeed, Jabotinsky wrote that “[it] is of no concern to
the state that Mr [sic] X dwells in a palatial mansion and Mr
[sic] Y is grumbling why he too cannot occupy an equally
luxurious place. Who
cares about that…?” Although
Jabotinsky backed minor redistributions of wealth, he justified
these on the basis of a minimally interventionist Biblical
philosophy, rather than through socialist or Marxist arguments
for egalitarianism or a command economy.[17]
This
perspective approximates an especially libertarian
strain of capitalism, as advocated by such philosophers as
Robert Nozick and Ayn Rand, rather than a capitalism which
incorporates egalitarian considerations (as advanced by John
Rawls) or an actual capitalist polity streaked with collectivist
cultural influences (as in East Asia and Western Europe).
Unlike the latter two systems, libertarian philosophy can
focus solely on core
capitalist tenets (individual rights, including that of private
property) to the exclusion of other considerations
(egalitarianism or collectivist cultural norms) and thereby
maximize internal consistency.
Accordingly, and because this paper delves deeply into an
array of complicated historical trends and developments, it uses
Jabotinsky’s particularly libertarian view of capitalism in
order to preclude reasoning that a capitalist perspective would
prescribe self-contradictory economic or political policies.
Returning
to the matter of Jewish land purchases, this Revisionist
perspective would see Arab small land holders as well within
their legal rights to sell inherited family lands to Jews.
However, it would
be arguable that the Arab elite – which had accumulated
massive land holdings by taking advantage of Ottoman land
reforms – contradicted capitalist precepts by disregarding its
tenants’ interests in economic dealings with the Jews, given
the informal nature of ownership understandings among notables
and peasants. Following
Locke, an ideological capitalist could contend that such lands
first belonged to the peasants who farmed them,[18]
and therefore that notables could not assume legal possession
over them – unless these peasants consented to elite
ownership of their fields, whether to evade extra taxes, escape
conscription, or pay off loans.
Even
more nebulous, from this viewpoint, was the Arab notable’s
permission to dispose of lands that he did not yet
legally own. In
several letters to the JNF and Jewish Agency in 1930-1931,
Heinrich Marguiles, of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, described a
common mercantile stratagem employed by the Arab elite: “the
Effendi [Arab notable]…makes a sales contract with the Jews
without first owning the land and afterwards pieces together the
property” by both “[exerting] pressure upon the Fellah [Arab
peasant]” and offering “a lump sum” in exchange for the
peasant’s “problematic musha claim.”[19]
The elite thus obtained from “the
musha-Fellaheen…lands for prices that were a tiny fraction of
the price for which they were resold” – even Arab tenants
received heftier reimbursements from Jewish purchasers whenever
the former were forced to relinquish their farmlands.[20]
Yet Arab notables did not contradict capitalist
principles by paying no more than peasants were willing to
accept in exchange for their musha’ shares.
Rather, they violated capitalist precepts only insofar as
they applied violence – the “pressure” of which Marguiles
wrote, in violation of the property rights which Jabotinsky so
deeply valued – to finalize these transactions.
Although
Marguiles warned that “Zionism has at least furthered this
development,” he admitted that the trend “has gone on for a
long time and without any connection with Zionism,” but rather
grew out of the Fellaheen’s disadvantageous economic status
under Ottoman rule.[21]
In any event, the class identities of Arab land sellers
are of minor consequence to a Revisionist outlook in
establishing Jewish legal culpability for these Arab
displacements – the Jews were willing to pay inflated prices
to both notables and peasants.
As Marguiles wrote in another letter, “[the] Fellachen
[sic]…have recently grasped these connections and begun to
sell directly to the Jews….In this way they obtain the high
prices which the Jews are accustomed to paying and become rich
as a result,” [22]
and as noted above, the Jews began to deal primarily with Arab
small landowners.
Further,
as evidenced by both these transactions and Marguiles’
letters, both groups were willing to sell their lands to
the Jews, who could not even afford to purchase all the holdings
they were offered. In
April 1945, the Palestine Administration’s Director of Land
Registrations wrote that “[the] JNF were being inundated with
offers from Arab sellers,”[23]
and in November 1946, the JNF’s Joseph Weitz stated that
“the potential for land purchase has not decreased.
The potential remains each year at 200-250 thousand
dunams,” hence “the will to sell in the Arab camp hasn’t
decreased.”[24]
Therefore,
from Jabotinsky’s Revisionist outlook, Jewish land purchases
merely overlooked –
or at most disregarded
– a contradiction of capitalist precepts, in that the
resulting revenues accrued to the Arab elite rather than to
peasants. Yet
insofar as the former applied violence or the threat of violence
to pressure the latter to sell its musha’ shares, and
insofar as the latter lost legal ownership of its land holdings
through economic transactions in which it did not participate,
the former actively
violated capitalist principles in obtaining lands from the
latter – holdings which both groups were willing and able to
liquidate at the hands of Jewish purchasers.
Accordingly, the Jews who bought these lands neither
upheld nor breached capitalist tenets, because they paid
for “all the land purchased in the mandate period”[25]
at prices acceptable to both notables and peasants.
In short, the Jews merely translated lands that
had been obtained in violation of capitalist precepts, into revenues
which accrued to the individuals who had breached these precepts.
That these revenues were distributed in a manner
inconsistent with pure capitalism, was the doing of the Arab
notables who had contradicted capitalist precepts in the first
place.
Yet
Zionist policies contributed to the transformation of the
Palestinian Arabs into a relatively deracinated, needy,
and distressed populace.[26]
This would have little relevance to a Revisionist
perspective which starts its analysis with the individual – to
whom it awards political and property rights which are absolute
when compared with society as a whole.
Socialism, however, gives social considerations
relatively more weight than individual rights.[27]
It
then becomes pertinent that the Jews of Mandatory Palestine
constituted a much wealthier, urban, and literate population
than did the Arab community,[28]
whose condition, as seen above, was increasingly miserable.
The disparity between these two peoples was enormous, and
accordingly, a socialist perspective would rank Arab needs
before Jewish desires: Arab small landowners did
not contradict socialist tenets by selling their land,
though powerful landlords did
violate these precepts when they evicted tenants from the lands
upon which their livelihoods depended – the peasantry needed
monetary relief (and psychological security).
Jewish purchasers, however, used their abilities
(monetary wealth) not to satisfy this need by bettering the
welfare of the Arab population in whose midst they were
settling, but rather to fulfill their own selfish desire for a
Jewish national homeland. In
so doing, not only did the Jews not remedy the peasantry’s
predicament, it actually exacerbated the Arab plight, magnifying
Mandatory socioeconomic inequalities.
In short, the property rights of the Jewish minority
clashed with the welfare of the Arab majority.
At this juncture, a pure socialist outlook would conclude
that whether or not Zionist land purchases transpired legally,
they caused socially undesirable consequences, and therefore
went against socialist philosophy.
There
was indeed a “Diaspora nationalism” separate from Zionist
territorial nationalism, as exemplified by such organizations as
the Bund, whose goal was a democratic East Europe and Russia
“that would give the Jews national cultural autonomy
appertaining to them as persons and not depending on a
territory.”[29]
With a “dual
social and national theme,”[30]
it was much more consistent with pure socialism.
It was only the Holocaust that “finished off
Bundism,” by providing Jews an impetus to put their own
long-term self-interest first[31]
– but self-interest is a very personal, selfish concern,
hardly central to any pure socialist philosophy.
It is, instead, the keystone of Revisionism’s individualist
and capitalist philosophy.
In short, Socialist Zionism may have dominated the Jewish
nationalist movement – but only to the extent to which it
adopted such Revisionist tenets.
II.
Immigration
Jewish
Immigration
The
first aliyah, or wave of Jewish immigration to the
Palestine region, began in 1881,[32]
and in combination with a second aliyah, doubled the
Jewish population of that region by the end of the First World
War, to some 60,000. This
community had nearly tripled in size by 1931, and in the
mid-1930s, as the Nazi specter began to overwhelm Germany and
central Europe, a fifth aliyah doubled the Jewish
population once more. After
Britain’s 1939 White Paper imposed stringent immigration
restrictions, illegal entries into the Mandate failed to
maintain this explosive growth rate – although by 1946, the
Jewish population had risen to over 540,000.[33]
The
Arab population of Palestine bitterly contested Jewish
immigration. “The
Arab Case for Palestine,” submitted to an Anglo-American
committee on “the problem of Palestine,” claimed that
because “[the] Arabs of Palestine…form the majority of the
population…they cannot submit to a policy of immigration which
is [sic] pursued for long will turn them from a majority into a
minority in an alien state; and they claim the democratic right
of majority to make its decisions in matters of urgent national
concern.”[34]
On democratic grounds, then, they called for a Mandatory
intervention in the flow of immigration.
Jabotinsky’s
individualist and capitalist tendencies, however, logically must
lead to a diametrically opposite conclusion, even on this
extra-economic issue. Revisionism
favored stringent restrictions on government powers to “avoid
any excessive encroachment on civil society,” advocating a
“separation of powers” and “political representation
through a parliament.”[35]
Although Socialist Zionists labeled him a fascist, and
Ben-Gurion himself called Jabotinsky “Vladimir Hitler,”[36]
the father of Revisionism saw the state as “above
all…protecting the rights of the individual,” and avoiding
corporatism by “dealing with citizens and not interest groups,
associations or classes.”[37]
Despite
his democratic views, therefore, his fear of totalitarianism
fostered an aversion to a “tyranny of the majority.”[38]
Instead, Revisionism’s preoccupation with liberal
individual rights would lead it to advocate a two-tiered
immigration policy. First,
and most importantly, it would insist on the protection of
Mandatory citizens’ rights to do as they desire with their own
private property – for example, selling it to foreigners, or hiring or hosting them within its confines.
Second, in its capacity as a policeman, a future Jewish
state would need to restrict immigration that poses a military
or criminal threat to its citizens.
Accordingly,
Revisionism would be locked – philosophically – into
criticizing the 1939 White Paper so
long as Palestinian Jews were willing to support immigrating
Jews with their own resources (whether by providing them
jobs, homes, or welfare) rather than putting them on the public
dole. The White
Paper revealed that such was the case, admitting that “it is
not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish
immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed
economically.”[39]
As discussed above, Jewish organizations purchased land
holdings, while “external Jewish groups” also provided “a
great part of industrial capital” so as to “[create]
employment” and “[provide] the necessities for the new
immigrants;” moreover, the Jewish community also provided its
own “educational, medical, and welfare facilities.”
Yet the Palestinian Jewish community’s willingness to
support its immigrating coreligionists was not based solely upon
charity: by the time of the fourth aliyah in the 1920s,
“a new type of industry emerged that was based on capital
import and previous industrial skills of the immigrants
themselves…immigration was itself creating a market;”
indeed, “Jewish immigrants were largely responsible for the
industrialization of Palestine.”[40]
In
sum, immigrating Jews were voluntarily
welcomed by the same population which economically
supported them in Palestine; therefore their migration
violated no capitalist tenets.
The individuals of the Jewish community may have engaged
in socialist practices, but as long as they were not forced to
do so by the Mandatory administration, such was their right, as
even Jabotinsky acknowledged; he emphasized voluntary
cooperation and the reaching of consensus on such issues.
The Yishuv – “a voluntary rather than a compulsory
association of the Jews of Palestine” – actually
approximated this ideal.[41]
The
larger Palestine Mandate, however, did not.
The Palestinian Arabs were correct in claiming majority
status throughout the Mandatory era, yet the petition cited
above marked a fundamentally divergent position on Jewish
immigration.[42]
In the absence of any potential for consensus, then,
Jabotinsky ruled out a tyranny of the Arab majority – in
contrast to the “hypocritical silence” of Socialist Zionism
on the subject.[43]
The Left’s philosophy could not possibly resolve (in
favor of the Jews) this pure
clash between individual rights
and the preferences of
the Mandate’s majority population.
Yet despite Socialist control of the Zionist movement,
Jewish immigration continued – Socialist Zionism, therefore,
had chosen implicitly in favor of the Revisionist stance.[44]
Judean
Immigration
Why,
then, does Israel grant citizenship to all Jewish immigrants,
while applying a more rigorous policy to non-Jewish migrants?
Is this not simply a manifestation of the will of the
Jewish demographic majority which exists in Israel today?
It is true that even a liberal Zionist like Jabotinsky
had a “concept of the nation” which clashed with his “idea
of an impersonal state managing a universalist citizenship”
– poorly reconciling “the collective identity of the
nation” with “the supreme value of the individual, his
freedom, and his rights.”[45]
Yet these notions were more complex than mere collectivism,
an ideology that better approximates Socialist Zionist thinking.
Here the ancient history of Jewish sovereignty over
Palestine acquires ideological significance.
Modern Zionism advocates not a beginning, but
rather a resumption, of Jewish statehood there – whose
previous incarnation was the state of Judea, destroyed by the
Roman Empire early in the first millennium CE:
The
Judean government ruled over a citizenry which worked and held
property in Judea, its authority invested in the Davidic and
Hasmonean dynasties during intermittent periods of independence,
and in the Persian, Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Roman Empires at
other times. Yet its
population was tied to its religion and geography to a degree
uncommon among other states at the time – to such an extent
that Rome, unable to assimilate it into its Empire as a
semi-independent province, opted to destroy it through several
Roman-Jewish wars, chief among them the First Jewish Revolt
(66-70 CE), in which Jerusalem and its Second Temple were razed,
and the Bar Kokhba Rebellion (132-135 CE), in which the Romans
inflicted casualties of “up to a million,” including
refugees, thereby cutting “the Jewish population in the
country” by roughly “fifty percent,” and turning the Jews
into a minority in the region, which the Romans renamed “[the]
Syrian province of Palestine.”
Although Jews continued to live in present-day Galilee,
the Judean heartland – centered on Jerusalem – was emptied
of “almost every settlement,” Jewish holdings there were
confiscated, Jews were “[forbidden] to enter the area,” and
so many Judeans were taken captive that the market price of
slaves dropped “throughout the Roman Empire.”[46]
Although their religion survived, the Jews of Judea
failed to recover demographically after Bar Kokhba.[47]
Eventually, almost the entire Judean citizenry migrated
or was expelled from the region over which its state once ruled.
Many lost their property at the hands of invading forces;
all lost the benefits of formal citizenship in their dismantled
state.
In
fact, the only surviving trace of that uprooted citizenship was
the Judean religion (Judaism) – its adherents largely
descended from ancient Judeans, and its conversion regulations
taking the place of a naturalization policy.
For Jews – and especially for Jewish nationalists –
religion “is more than just a faith;” for the “thousands
of years of dispersion, [it] has been the national symbol of
Judaism.[48]
An irreligious Jew condemns apostasy almost as much as an
orthodox Jew.”[49]
Moses Hess, the nineteenth-century “father of German
Social Democracy and pioneer of Socialist Zionism,” denounced
Reform Judaism on the grounds that it “[sought] to make
Judaism just a religious group” – in other words, “to
deprive it of its raison d’etre, which was the preservation of the Jewish nation.”[50]
Similarly,
religion was an important component of the Jewish nation as
conceived by Jabotinsky, not as a primary element – Jabotinsky
only seriously considered the role of Judaism within Zionism in
his last decade of life – but rather as a means of unifying
“the body politic” and inculcating it with moral standards,
giving it the “unshakeable” character needed to achieve
other Zionist aims. Tellingly,
Jabotinsky focused on personal and informal forms of religion,
types “resistant to the straitjacket of ecclesiastical
structures” and similar to the religiosity “of the [Jewish]
Zealots who fought in the name of their faith against the Roman
invader.”[51]
It
would be nearly impossible to trace economic transactions back
two millennia in order to recover the properties taken from the
Judeans by force. The
loss of their state, however, was different – unlike the
ownership of tangible assets, citizenship – as religion –
could be retained and inherited very easily; throughout their
long exile, the Judeans and their descendants were identifiable
as Jews. However, it
was only in the years leading up to the reestablishment of
Israel that they attained both the international backing and
internal motivation necessary to reconstitute their state.
Accordingly,
Israeli citizens and immigrants are not individually awarded
reparations for their ancestors’ economic losses.
Yet Judeans (Jews) worldwide are offered a formal renewal
of Judean (Israeli) citizenship.
From a capitalist outlook, the significance of this
tender is that it includes, not specific economic assets,
but rather the right to pursue happiness – a capitalist notion[52]
enshrined in America’s Declaration of Independence – which
would have been their birthright, had the Judean state not been
dismantled nearly two millennia ago.
What is the meaning of this right?
Jabotinsky’s
Conception of the State
Rather
than the “instrumental and pragmatic use of armed coercion
defended by Socialist Zionism,” Jabotinsky espoused “a more
idealised [sic] and political role of force.”
On the one hand, he realized that the state could be
created only “by some force, more or less brutal, more or less
disciplined, that overturned the existing social and political
setup.” This was,
however, an empirical more than a philosophical conclusion.
On the other hand, therefore, Jabotinsky took – from
the political theory of his time – the idea of “force as the
essential element of the political sphere,” as embodied in
(among other notions) “the Weberian view” of the state as
holder of a “monopoly of legitimate violence.”[53]
With
such a totality of power, if the state is “unlimited and
unrestricted by individual rights,” it becomes “men’s
deadliest enemy.”[54]
The ideal capitalist state, then, is one which acts solely
to defend individual rights – or in Jabotinsky’s words, its
“sole duty” is “[defending] its members in danger.”[55]
Citizenship in such a state confers simply the protection
of the military, police force, and law courts – as financed by
taxation. It is the
resultant security which guarantees citizens “the right to
take the actions [they deem] necessary to achieve [their]
happiness.”[56]
Therefore Israel’s policy of offering Jews citizenship
– regardless of whether these potential immigrants are
welcomed by any individual existing citizens – amounts to
proffering them nothing more than automatic military and
legal protection.
This
may seem to be a rather trivial aspect of citizenship, yet its
overriding importance was learnt by the Judeans during the
millennia of persecution they experienced after the dismantling
of their state – when they came under the rule of other
“legal [monopolies] on the use of physical force,” in which they
were “legally disarmed victims.”
Without a state, Jabotinsky wrote, the eternally
persecuted Jews “[had] no name, no voice, no rights” – and
would receive “neither trust nor protection; [their] security
will be zero.”[57]
Zionism was required, then, to reestablish the Jewish
state as a bulwark against anti-Semitism, “a special state”
to restore to the Jew “at last the elementary right to peace
and security.”[58]
Capitalist
philosophy holds that “no man, or group of men, may seek to
gain values from others by the imposition of physical force upon
them.”[59]
As such, the Roman conquest of Judea was anti-capitalist
– it sought to subjugate the Judeans by destroying the state
committed to protecting them.
Likewise, Jewish immigration to Israel helps uphold
capitalist tenets by reversing this effect of Roman governance
– it seeks to restore to the Judeans’ descendants the
security which would have been theirs, had the Roman conquest
not occurred. In
short, and in Jabotinsky’s own words – which assign a
positive moral value to the enforcement of capitalist precepts
– “…now when the whole of the civilised [sic] world has
recognised [sic] that Jews have a right to return to Palestine,
which means that the Jews are, in principle, also ‘citizens’
and ‘inhabitants’ of Palestine,[60]
only they were driven out, and their return must be a lengthy
process, it is wrong to contend that meanwhile the local
population has the right to refuse to allow them to come
back.”[61]
III.
Israeli Independence
Under
Revisionism, as under capitalism, government has two main
components. First,
from a strictly functionalist viewpoint, a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force must pertain to “a certain geographic
territory;” this was not particularly problematic for Zionist
aims.[62]
Second, more significantly, and as noted throughout this
paper, government is “a social agency…whose purpose it is to
protect each man’s rights against infringement by others.”[63]
The Revisionist argument for Israeli independence, then,
would run along the following lines:
On
the one hand, a core aim of Zionism was the protection of its
adherents’ individual rights: Theodor Herzl wrote in 1897 that
“[the] nations in whose midst Jews live are all either
covertly or openly anti-Semitic,” to such an extent that
“the princes and peoples of this earth” would only arouse
“popular hatred” by granting the Jews “less than is
claimed as a right by every ordinary citizen.”
In this context, Herzl advocated a Jewish state to secure
Jews’ individual rights against traditional anti-Semitism,[64]
as did Jabotinsky in his quotation in the previous section.
On
the other hand, as early as 1919, the American King-Crane
Commission indicated that “nearly nine-tenths of the
[non-Jewish population of Palestine]” were “emphatically
against the entire Zionist program,” and thus condemned
“unlimited Jewish immigration” and “steady financial and
social pressure to surrender the land”[65]
– thereby signifying that the lack of a Jewish state in
Palestine would endanger Jewish capitalist
rights to immigrate and purchase land, a threat which was
realized in the 1939 White Paper.
The 1929 riots and 1936-1939 rebellion signified a
violent aspect of this peril,[66]
one which resurfaced in the communal fighting in the months
before Israeli independence.[67]
These threats to their individual rights permitted Jews – from a Revisionist perspective
– to declare statehood in order to assert these rights,
militarily if necessary.[68]
That Israel formally undertook not to violate the rights
of its non-Jewish
citizens only reinforces this claim to independence.[69]
In this sense, the case for Israeli independence follows
from the Revisionist arguments for Jewish land purchases and
immigration as discussed above – it is the argument that
Zionists should implement specific policies to protect these
rights, such as their prosecution of the War of Independence, as
discussed below.
Conversely,
a socialist perspective – holding government to be purely a
matter of societal self-determination – could not justify
Israeli independence without viewing both the Jewish and Arab
populations of Palestine to be wholly separate nations or
societies, each possessing the right to self-determination.
Yet, as explained above, a purely socialist outlook would
consider the entire region of Palestine to be a single unit,
belonging to the Palestinian Arabs collectively – Jewish
immigration and land purchases could not be taken into
consideration, because these Zionist activities violated
socialist tenets in the first place.
As such, it would be the Arabs – not the Jews – who
would hold the legal right to grant self-determination to, or
withhold it from, the Jews.
Because the Arab population overwhelmingly favored the
latter choice – even ignoring the fact that they still
constituted a two-thirds majority in the Mandate on the eve of
Israeli statehood – Jews would have contradicted socialist
precepts by exercising this self-determination.
That Israel nevertheless proclaimed independence under a
socialist-dominated provisional government was an implicit –
at the very least – endorsement of Revisionist liberal
philosophy.
IV.
Arab Refugees
From
1947 to 1949 – initially during fighting between Palestinian
Jews and Arabs, and later in the midst of war between Israel and
invading Arab regular armies – some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs
left the territories which became the state of Israel.[70]
In an article on The Origins of the Palestinian
Refugee Problem, Benny Morris described a multitude of
factors which contributed to the refugees’ flight, including
the Arab community’s “structural weaknesses,”[71]
its members’ fears of the Jewish military or of living under
Jewish rule, especially in the wake of the Deir Yassin massacre,[72]
Arab encouragement – and lack of discouragement – of escape,[73]
and Zionist policies.[74]
Israel’s role in
generating the Palestinian refugee predicament, then,
contradicted socialist philosophy for the same reason that
Jewish land purchases and immigration did: it benefited the
relatively affluent Jewish community at the expense of the Arab
majority. Yet Israel
assumed that role under a Socialist Zionist regime.
Why?
Jabotinsky’s
philosophical focus on the role of force did not entail an
“exaltation of war.” Although
other contemporaneous right-wing nationalists “celebrated war
as ‘the only way to cleanse the world,’” he mourned that
“[every] war is only a fratricide, every unknown soldier is
merely the holy victim of that worldwide, senseless and cruelly
savage absurdity.”[75]
It was, however, necessary to uphold Jews’ rights:
“deprived of military means of defence [sic] during their
diaspora existence, [Jews] were at the mercy of the powerful,
and to survive they had no alternative to dissimulation and
servility.” Only
an army would enable them “to fight to defend their Jewish
authenticity against all corners.”[76]
To fight the Palestinian Arabs – whom Jabotinsky
recognized as a separate “nationality” which would not
readily accede to Jewish statehood in the region – the Jews
had no option but “to build an ‘iron wall,’” to create “a
political fait accompli”
to which the Arabs would have to “resign themselves, little by
little.”[77]
This
was the philosophy which even the socialist Israeli provisional
government eventually embraced.
In another article, Morris investigated a decade of
Zionist thinking about transferring the Arabs from the geography
of a future Jewish state. He
concluded with the observation that Israeli leaders and
officials “all arrived at 1948, in no small measure owing to
the continuous anti-Zionist Arab violence which played out
against the growing persecution of Diaspora Jewry in…Europe,
with a mindset which was open to…transfer.”
Further, “almost all came to understand, after the
Arabs of Palestine had initiated the war and after the Arab
states invaded Palestine, that transfer was what the Jewish
state’s survival and future well-being demanded.”[78]
The
Arabs had initiated the use of force, and the Israeli state –
whose independence was justified, from a capitalist perspective,
by its commitment to protect its citizens’ rights – strove
to defend these rights. It
may be impossible to counterfactually determine which military
strategy would have guaranteed Israel’s survival while
minimizing the harm done to Palestinian Arab civilians – yet
it seems that some drastic approach was necessary: in
wartime, even Labor Zionist officers who were “ideologically
committed to coexistence with the Arabs” were swayed by
“conditions in the field, tactically and strategically” –
including pressing military necessities and fears of a future
“large, potential Fifth Column” – to assume “a mentality
of immediate survival over the long-term desirability of
coexistence.”[79]
V.
Conclusions
Zionist
institutions followed capitalist precepts in all four of the major policies which brought about the state of
Israel: Zionists legally
bought part of the lands that would come under Israeli
governance, acquired the rest in a defensive
war which it fought on behalf of its citizens’
individual rights, and populated these territories through uncoerced
immigration. However,
this required a de facto repudiation
of the socialist ideology which the Zionist leadership embraced de jure: Zionists actively and passively inflicted both socioeconomic
and military harm on the Palestinian Arab peasantry, and moreover failed
to respect the political wishes of the regional Arab majority.
History, it would seem, calls for a profound reevaluation
of the extent to which Zionist nationalism was shaped by
Jabotinsky’s Revisionism and the deeper influences of
classical liberal philosophy.
[1]
Martin Sicker, Judaism, Nationalism, and the Land of
Israel (Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., 1992), pp.
137-140; Alain Dieckhoff, The Invention of a Nation:
Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel, trans.
Jonathan Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press,
2003), pp. 50-51, pp. 90-91.
[4]
Kenneth W. Stein, “One Hundred Years of Social Change: The
Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” in New
Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the
State, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New York
University Press, 1991), p. 60.
[5]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Palestine’s Rural Economy,
1917-1939,” Studies in Zionism Vol. 8, No. 1
(1987): pp. 33-37.
[7]
Kenneth W. Stein, “One Hundred Years of Social Change: The
Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” in New
Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the
State, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New York
University Press, 1991), pp. 63-64.
[8]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Palestine’s Rural Economy,
1917-1939,” Studies in Zionism Vol. 8, No. 1
(1987): pp. 34-35.
[9]
Kenneth W. Stein, “One Hundred Years of Social Change: The
Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” in New
Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the
State, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New York
University Press, 1991), pp. 61-63.
[10]
The introduction of European medical technologies, in
general, and purposive British attempts to lower Arab death
rates and infant mortality, in particular, had a major
impact. Yet this
and other British and Jewish efforts failed to change the
fact that, economically, “there was never enough capital
to support the Arab population” during the Mandatory era.
Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise
History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Upper Saddle
River, N.J.: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), p. 49.
[11]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Jewish and Non-Jewish Population of
Palestine-Israel, 1517-2004,” in History, Politics, and
Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader,
ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging,
2006), p. 4.
[12]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Palestine’s Rural Economy,
1917-1939,” Studies in Zionism Vol. 8, No. 1
(1987): p. 35.
[13]
Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), pp. 49-50.
[14]
Kenneth W. Stein, “One Hundred Years of Social Change: The
Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” in New
Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the
State, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New York
University Press, 1991), p. 69.
[15]
William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East,
3d ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), pp. 254-255.
[16]
Dieckhoff, pp. 178-179.
[18]
John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government
(Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1986), p. 20.
[19]
Heinrich Marguiles, “Letter from Heinrich Marguiles to Dr.
A. Granovsky: Keren Kajemeth Lejisrael, Jerusalem: Jaffa: 12
March 1930,” in History, Politics, and Diplomacy of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth
W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), p.
41.
[20]
Heinrich Marguiles, “Letter from Mr. Heinrich Marguiles of
the Anglo-Palestine Bank to Palestine Jewish Agency,” in History,
Politics, and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence:
Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), pp. 46-47.
[22]
Heinrich Marguiles, “Extract of Letter from Mr. Heinrich
Marguiles to Mr. Felix Rosenbluth: Jaffa: 5 February
1930,” in History, Politics, and Diplomacy of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth
W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), p.
39.
[23]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Status of Arab Offers to Sell Land to
Jews,” in History, Politics, and Diplomacy of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth
W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), p.
55.
[25]
Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), p. 50.
[26]
On the one hand, Arab “‘landlessness’ was not due
primarily to Jewish land purchase” – by the Mandatory
period, “[a] large plurality of Palestinians who were
engaged in rural occupations were in fact not landowners,”
while displaced peasants often discovered other sources of
work. On the
other hand, this legal landlessness engendered “an
intrinsically precarious essence to the livelihood of the
Palestinian Arab peasant” – an insecurity which was
substantiated by the physical landlessness created
“when land was sold to Jewish buyers or Arab land
brokers” [Kenneth W. Stein, “One Hundred Years of Social
Change: The Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,”
in New Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years
of the State, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New
York University Press, 1991), pp. 64-67], accompanied by
“land scarcity [and] congestion,” even rendering “many
smallholders…penniless and [in] the ranks of the landless
and urban poor” [Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine:
Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939-1948
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 30].
Although
Jewish economic advances generated “work opportunities for
Arabs as well as Jews” (Bickerton and Klausner, p. 51),
mirroring this trend was an increasing “exclusion
of Arabs from the Jewish economy,” aimed largely at
preventing the Jewish community from “[depending] on or
[exploiting] Arab labor,” a belief “bound up with the
Zionist socialist ethos” and advocated by “the party
faithful, led by Ben Gurion” [Benny Morris, Righteous
Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001
(New York: Vintage Books, 2001), pp. 50-51].
Moreover, British infrastructure development and
“changes in the Arab sector” were also responsible for
the “general economic growth in Palestine.”
Bickerton and Klausner concluded that “[the]
resources of Palestine were limited, and although there was
general economic growth, Jews and Arabs were basically in
conflict in the economic sphere” (Bickerton and Klausner,
p. 52).
A
1935 Memorandum of Arab Grievances emphasized this
point by complaining that “every plot of land in Palestine
which is transferred to Jewish bodies…ceases to be land
from which the Arab can gain any advantage…but he is
deprived for ever from employment on that land.”
The communiqué asserted that such Zionist policies
“will result…in the expropriation of the Arabs from
their lands, in their dispersion, and in the undermining of
the national structure” [“Memorandum of Arab Grievances:
Palestine: 25 November 1935,” in History, Politics, and
Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader,
ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging,
2006), pp. 50-51]. These
fears, along with the “increasing impoverishment…of the
Palestinian Arab peasantry,” motivated that population to
“[express] their discontent in outbreaks of violence”
against the British, Zionists, and even Arab notables,
particularly in the 1929 riots and 1936-1939 revolt.
[William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle
East, 3d ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), p. 256].
[27]
Government, in capitalism, has no legal right to violate the
rights of one individual, unless that individual has
violated the rights of another.
He can do so only by initiating the use of force –
which, in the economic sphere, translates into an
involuntary “transfer of holdings from one person
to another” [Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), pp. 150-153].
In short, economic consequences are less
important than the process by which they arise.
Yet
whereas capitalism perceives a causal connection between
production and possession, and bases its notions of
individual rights upon this linkage, socialism severs
production from the distribution of possessions (Ibid., p.
160) – it distinguishes what each should receive
from what each should give – and only then can it
profess, ‘from each according to his ability, to each
according to his need.’
This maxim, however, is only one among many possible
“patterned distribution” principles (Ibid., p. 156),
because claiming that production does not imply
rightful possession has no logical implication for what does
imply it. Still,
socialism tends to frown on the amplification of economic
inequalities, and Marx’s criticism of selfishness and
claim that proletarian “pauperism” makes the bourgeoisie
“unfit…to be the ruling class,” can be taken as
evidence of a rather egalitarian distribution principle
[Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Communist
Manifesto,” chap. in Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto, trans.
Martin Milligan (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988), p.
221].
[28]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Economic, Demographic, Monetary and
Fiscal Statistics for Palestine to 1939,” in History,
Politics, and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence:
Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), pp. 81-83.
[31]
Dieckhoff, p. 6. Even
from a socialist perspective which permitted its adherents
to defend their lives at any expense, the end of the
Holocaust marked the end of any widespread immediate threat to Jewish lives in Europe.
Though Jews might fear a repetition of the Nazi
genocide, such concerns would be merely conceptual, in contrast to the very real effects of Zionist policies in the Palestine Mandate.
[32]
Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), p. 19.
[33]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Jewish and Non-Jewish Population of
Palestine-Israel, 1517-2004,” in History, Politics, and
Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader,
ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging,
2006), p. 4.
[34]
“The Arab Office: The Arab Case for Palestine: March
1946,” in History, Politics, and Diplomacy of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict: Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth
W. Stein (Providence: Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), p.
117.
[36]
Ibid., p. 175, p. 184.
[39]
“HMG White Paper: Statement of Policy: May 1939,” in History,
Politics, and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence:
Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), p. 89.
[40]
Kenneth W. Stein, “Economic, Demographic, Monetary and
Fiscal Statistics for Palestine to 1939,” in History,
Politics, and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence:
Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), pp. 81-83.
[41]
Dieckhoff, pp. 180-181.
[44]
Interestingly, Jabotinsky also advocated “a determined
commitment to serve the cause of the nation, if necessary
defying legal rules openly when they imposed restrictions on
the vitality of a people.”
Dieckhoff here mentions “the panoply of British
legislation imposing strict conditions on Jewish immigration
and land purchase” as exemplifying said restrictions
(Dieckhoff, p. 216) – yet these were, even more clearly,
violations of the rights granted Zionists by Revisionist and
capitalist philosophies.
Despite Revisionism’s “national organicism” and
the related ideological tenets which place it in “the
family of conservative national movements” (Ibid., pp.
224-225), then, its basic liberal principles and the causes
it espoused establish it as a truly capitalist nationalism.
[46]
Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Bark Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and
Realism in International Politics, ed. David Altshuler,
trans. Max D. Ticktin (Chappaqua, N.Y.: Rossel Books, 1983),
pp. 45-48.
[47]
The national birthrate dropped, while Jewish emigration from
the desolated province was “involuntarily accelerated,”
catalyzing the Judeans’ transformation into “a landless
people” (Harkabi, pp. 50-51).
This process, however, had begun with the Babylonian
conquest of 586 BCE, establishing Jewish exile and refugee
communities in Babylonia and Egypt, while Judea retained
only a minority of world Jewry [Raphael Patai, Tents of
Jacob: The Diaspora – Yesterday and Today (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 12].
During Hellenistic and Roman times, emigration
continued up to the Jewish-Roman wars due to a combination
of economic and political pressures [Benedikt Otzen, Judaism
in Antiquity: Political Development and Religious Currents
from Alexander to Hadrian, trans. Frederick H. Cryer
(Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press Ltd., 1990) p.
54]; for example, the prominent Jewish community of Rome
descended from “the slaves brought in by” imperial
conquerors of Judea from 63-37 BCE [Margaret Williams,
“Being a Jew in Rome: Sabbath Fasting as an Expression of
Romano-Jewish Identity,” in Negotiating Diaspora:
Jewish Strategies in the Roman Empire, ed. John M. G.
Barclay (London: T & T Clark International, 2004), p.
8].
[48]
Although Zionism is a modern phenomenon, “the idea of
Jewish nationalism…is probably the oldest nationalist
conception known to history.”
Judeans were first to “[articulate] the fundamental
concepts that have shaped the history of nationalism,”
including “the idea of the chosen people, the
consciousness of national history, and national
Messianism” [Martin Sicker, Judaism, Nationalism, and
the Land of Israel (Boulder, Westview Press, Inc.,
1992), p. x]. “It
would not be too much of a stretch,” confirms Eller, “to
regard the Zealots and Maccabees as nationalists” [Jack
David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An
Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 37].
[49]
Joseph Badi, Religion in Israel Today: The Relationship
Between State and Religion (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1959), p. 43.
[50]
Dieckhoff, pp. 21-23.
[52]
Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York:
Signet, 1964), p. 114.
[53]
Dieckhoff, pp. 212-213.
[59]
John Hospers, Libertarianism: A Political Philosophy for
Tomorrow (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 418.
[60]
The preceding discussion of Jews’ individual rights
focuses on rather intangible aspects of citizenship, and
discounts the plausibility of restoring specific territorial
possessions to whomever owned them before the Jewish-Roman
wars. Therefore,
the Revisionist case for reviving the Judean state within
the Palestine Mandate in particular, if it is to be strictly
consistent, depends primarily on the capitalist
justification of more recent Jewish immigration and land
purchases – which in turn likely rest on the symbolic
value of the region to Jews worldwide.
[61]
Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, “The Ethics of the Iron
Wall,” 1923, The World of Jabotinsky, 2001,
Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, 6 November 2006, <http://www.jabotinsky.org/Jaboworld/docs/ethics.doc>,
p. 5.
[62]
Zionist immigration had led to the concentration of Jewish
populations in the Palestine Mandate along the Mediterranean
coast, in eastern Galilee, and in and around Jerusalem
(Bickerton and Klausner, p. 80) – specific geographic
regions. Although
they barely formed a demographic majority in the territories
allocated to them under the partition plan of UN Resolution
181, this majority did exist, while hundreds of
thousands of potential immigrants remained in European DP
camps due to British immigration restrictions (Ibid., pp.
82-85) which, as discussed above, violated their individual
rights. Insofar
as these immigrants would have bolstered the Jewish
majority, then, a capitalist analysis would consider them as
contributing toward Israel’s demographic claim to specific
territories.
Considerations
such as these explain why Jabotinsky saw Zionism as
concerned primarily with “establishing a Jewish majority
in Palestine” – this was to be “the first step towards
the creation of the state.”
Socialism was an entirely separate aim, and
Jabotinsky believed that leftist Zionists were therefore
mistaken in adopting “a false synthesis by trying to
reconcile the national aim with determination to build a
just society.” Again,
although Revisionism “[asserted] the absolute primacy of
the fact of nationhood,” like other rightist nationalisms,
“it did not follow that the whole social dimension of life
was supposed to be subordinated to the imperatives of the
state.” Dieckhoff,
p. 185.
[63]
Hospers, pp. 418-419.
[64]
Theodor Herzl, “The Jewish Question,” in History,
Politics, and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence:
Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), pp. 8-11.
[65]
“The American King-Crane Commission Report Summarizes the
Popular Ideas of Nationalism in the Middle East, 1919,” in
Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, ed.
Akram Fouad Khater (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004),
p. 208.
[66]
Cleveland, pp. 256-258.
[68]
The military aspect of Israeli independence will be
discussed below.
[69]
Even Benny Morris conceded that “the majority of
Zionists…arrived from Europe with liberal or
social-democratic views and aimed to establish an
egalitarian or at least democratic polity” [Benny Morris,
“Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus of 1949,” in The
War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, ed.
Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 40].
In
the same vein, the Israeli declaration of independence
promised to “promote the development of the country for
the benefit of all its inhabitants,” and proclaimed that
the new state would “uphold the full social and political
equality of all its citizens, without distinction of race,
creed, or sex,” and “guarantee full freedom of
conscience, worship, education, and culture”
[“Proclamation of the State of Israel: 14 May 1948,” in History,
Politics, and Diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Documentary Reader, ed. Kenneth W. Stein (Providence:
Allegra Print and Imaging, 2006), p. 143].
Israel was not born with a purely capitalist
government, but its relatively free nature – whose
democratic aspects kept it, to a large extent, dependent
upon “the consent of the governed” – sanctioned its
independence [Rand, pp. 126-129].
[70]
Benny Morris, “Origins of the Palestinian Refugee
Problem,” in New Perspectives on Jewish Studies,
ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New York University
Press, 1991), p. 43.
[74]
Morris asserted that “[up] to the beginning of April 1948,
there was no yishuv [Jewish community] plan…to
expel the Arab inhabitants of Palestine,” but “[the]
prospect and need to prepare for the invasion gave birth to
the Haganah’s [precursor to the Israel Defense Forces]
Plan D,” which “gave…[Haganah commanders] carte
blanche to completely clear vital areas; it allowed the
expulsion of hostile or potentially hostile Arab
villages.” He
claimed that while the sheer complexity of the circumstances
precludes “a single-cause explanation of the exodus from
most sites,” “the spring of 1948” witnessed “a
general shift…from a prevalence of cumulative internal
Arab factors…to a predominance of external, compulsive
ones,” where, “in most places,” a Jewish “attack or
the…fear of an imminent attack” constituted “the final
and decisive precipitant to flight.”
Benny Morris, “Origins of the Palestinian Refugee
Problem,” in New Perspectives on Jewish Studies,
ed. Laurence J. Silberstein (New York: New York University
Press, 1991), p. 53.
[78]
Benny Morris, “Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus of
1949,” in The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History
of 1948, ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 48.
[79]
Ibid., pp. 46-49.
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